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This paper introduces a framework of investor behavior in which investors form their 
expectations regarding the credibility of a prospective IMF program in reforming the financial 
sector characterized by domestic implicit guarantees. We examine the changes in financial sector 
returns in response to IMF-related news such as announcements of program negotiations and 
approval to infer investor perception regarding the Fund support associated with the program. 
We test the implications of our framework based on the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s. Using 
daily financial sector returns from Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, we find that news of program 
negotiations and approval increases financial sector returns in Indonesia and Korea. The findings 
are consistent with investor perception that negotiated IMF programs are non-credible due to 
expected continuation of domestic implicit guarantees during the future Fund program. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper examines the changes in financial sector returns due to IMF-related news in 
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand during the East Asian crisis to investigate the possibility of 
creditor moral hazard. Several observers have suggested that the Fund-support to Indonesia, 
Korea, and Thailand during the recent East Asian crisis may have provided additional implicit 
guarantees to investors, which would motivate them to take excessive risks (Edwards, 1998; 
Eichengreen, 2000; Feldstein, 1998; Friedman, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; Schwartz, 1998). 
Existing domestic implicit guarantees imply that financial intermediaries or their owners were 
protected by implicit or explicit government guarantees against losses, which reduces financial 
firms’ incentive to manage risk (Krugman, 1998; McKinnon and Pill, 1997). Domestic moral 
hazard could become more pronounced, if Fund-support to crisis countries signaled the 
continuation of domestic implicit guarantees. The key objective of this paper is to test whether a 
prospective IMF program signals the continuation of domestic moral hazard in crisis countries’ 
financial sectors. We call this kind of moral hazard as the IMF-induced creditor moral hazard. 
Besides Asia, recent financial crises in Turkey, Russia, and elsewhere suggest that the frequency 
of the IMF’s involvement in emerging markets is likely to increase in the future. Therefore, it is 
important to understand whether IMF-induced creditor moral hazard exists in emerging markets. 
This paper focuses on financial sector returns for two reasons. First, many observers have 
emphasized the vulnerabilities of the financial sector as the primary source of the East Asian 
crisis (among others, Akerlof and Romer, 1993; Harvey and Roper, 1999; Krugman, 1999; 
Stiglitz, 1999). In fact, they have argued that the financial sectors of the crisis countries seriously 
suffered from adverse selection problem before the crisis and hence the extension of the IMF 
support. The much publicized government-financial firms-corporations triangle that exists in 
these countries has been pointed out as the root cause of the crisis. Second, IMF funds mainly 
increase the liquidity of the program country, particularly the liquidity of the financial sector. 
Therefore, changes in financial sector returns due to IMF-related news (such as announcements 
of program negotiations and approval) may reflect investors’ expectations regarding the future 
performance of this sector due to an IMF program and the program’s credibility.  
The previous research on creditor moral hazard in equity markets is scant. Most studies 
have analyzed bond markets and evidence is provided from emerging markets in general and 3 
crisis countries in particular.
1 With respect to creditor moral hazard in equity markets, there are 
only a handful of studies. Sarno and Taylor (1999) provide the initial tests of creditor moral 
hazard. Evrensel and Kutan (2004b) expand the initial tests by providing a theoretical framework 
for creditor moral hazard in equity markets. In both studies, composite stock market returns are 
used to test for creditor moral hazard. Although other studies (e.g., Brealey and Kaplanis, 2004; 
Hayo and Kutan, 2003; Lau and McInish, 2003; Zhang, 2001) have investigated the effects of 
IMF-related news on asset returns, they do not employ financial sector returns. More 
importantly, these studies do not test for creditor moral hazard. This paper is the initial study in 
the literature to test for creditor moral hazard in equity markets by using data on financial sector 
returns. We provide empirical evidence on the IMF-induced creditor moral hazard based on the 
changes in financial sector returns in the stock markets of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand during 
the East Asian crisis. Our study is important because the IMF-induced creditor moral hazard, if 
exists, is likely to be present in sectors that are associated with substantial domestic implicit 
guarantees.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the characteristics of crisis 
countries’ financial sectors to set the stage for the examination of domestic moral hazard in these 
countries. Then it constructs a framework that establishes a link between domestic moral hazard 
and creditor moral hazard due to IMF support. Section 3 reports the results of the GARCH 
estimations of financial sector stock returns that provide evidence on the link between the 
domestic and IMF-induced creditor moral hazard. Section 4 concludes.     
 
2. Characteristics of Financial Sectors in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand and the 
Framework of Creditor Moral Hazard due to IMF Support  
  In this section, we discuss the relevance of the financial sector in the creation of the East 
Asian crisis, summarize the characteristics of the sample countries’ financial sectors prior to the 
crisis, and explain the sources of the IMF-induced creditor moral hazard.   
 
The East Asian Crisis as a Banking Crisis  
In the first generation currency crisis models, currency crisis occurs because the 
government with persistent money-financed budget deficits uses a limited stock of reserves to 
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peg its exchange rate (Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984. When reserves fell to a critical 
level, it becomes unsustainable to maintain the exchange rate peg and a speculative attack on the 
currency takes place. However, most researchers agree that the East Asian currency crisis of the 
1990s did not have the characteristics of the first generation currency crisis model. At the time of 
the East Asian crisis, economic fundamentals in crisis countries did not indicate any 
inconsistency between macroeconomic policies and the exchange rate peg. In fact, prior to the 
crisis, the East Asian countries had demonstrated robust growth without any immediate danger of 
inflation, unemployment, and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies (Krugman, 1998). 
Hence, the Asian crisis did not take place in a macroeconomic environment described by the 
first-generation crisis models. 
An alternative explanation is that currency crises may take place without any significant 
deterioration in economic fundamentals (Calvo and Mendoza, 1995; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1996). In the second-generation models developed in Obstfeld (1986) and (1996), crises occur, 
despite strong fundamentals, because of the possibility of multiple equlibria. When the 
government decides about whether to defend the exchange rate peg, it faces a tradeoff between 
short-run macroeconomic flexibility and long-term credibility. If the market believes that the 
government will not defend the parity, a speculative attack on the currency will develop either as 
a result of a predicted future deterioration in fundamentals or purely through self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Obstfeld, 1994 and 1995). It has also been suggested that the unprecedented surge in 
capital inflows to the crisis countries made them vulnerable to self-fulfilling prophecies and 
financial panics (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).  
Even though the first generation crisis model may be dismissed in the absence of 
deteriorating fundamentals, many researchers argue that the scope of fundamentals should not be 
limited to factors related to fiscal or monetary policy. In fact, it has been suggested that weak 
financial sectors were at the root of East Asian financial crisis. (Akerlof and Romer, 1993; Alba 
et al., 1998; Alba et al., 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Ferri, 1998; Caprio and Honohan, 1999; 
Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel, 1999; Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1998; Harvey and 
Roper, 1999; Johnson et al., 1998; Krugman, 1999; Moreno, Pasadilla, and Remolona 1998; 
Stiglitz, 1999).  
The relevance of the financial system lies in the fact that effective financial 
intermediaries ensure efficient allocation of scarce capital, which implies the use of capital for its 5 
highest payoff (Pagano, 1993). Even though the importance of the financial sector in the 
economy is clear, the financial sector explanation of the East Asian crisis may be surprising at 
the outset. After all, the weaknesses in the financial sector must have been present for a relatively 
long period. It is possible that robust growth and large capital inflows in the East Asian countries 
encouraged by the exchange rate peg masked the weaknesses of the financial sector in these 
countries for more than a decade. In fact, the extent of the financial sector weakness in a country 
was linked with the severity of crisis; economies with the most vulnerable financial sectors, such 
as Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, our sample countries, experienced the most severe crisis 
(Moreno, 1998).  
 
Financial Sector Characteristics in Crisis Countries  
In examining the characteristics of financial sectors in crisis countries, we pay particular 
attention to the government-financial sector-corporations relationship, because this relationship 
is important to demonstrate the presence of domestic creditor moral hazard prior to the arrival of 
IMF assistance. The discussion of the IMF-induced creditor moral hazard in the next section 
critically depends on the pre-crisis characteristics of crisis countries’ financial sectors. For our 
purposes, the most important characteristic is the domestic moral hazard in financial sectors, 
which implies the protection of financial intermediaries or their owners by government 
guarantees against losses, which in turn reduces financial firms’ incentive to manage risk 
(Krugman, 1998; McKinnon and Pill, 1997). Even though it is agreed that domestic moral hazard 
distorts investment, there is some disagreement on the nature of the distortion. Some believe that 
overguaranteed and underregulated intermediaries can lead to excessive investment in the 
economy (McKinnon and Pill, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992), while others argue that the 
problem was unwise investment (real estate, auto plants, etc.), rather than excessive investment 
(Krugman, 1998).
2 
If firms and banks expected that that the government would not allow them to fail, this 
certainly affected the way the banks conducted their business. One of the important implications 
of such implicit guarantees is that banks would compete in asset sizes, not in profitability. Even 
                                                 
2 Krugman (1999) points out that excessive risky lending by financial institutions created asset price inflation. One 
of the reasons for the sustained asset price inflation without financial sector problems was the fact that, as excessive 
lending drove up the prices of risky assets, the financial condition of the intermediaries seemed sounder than it 
actually was.  
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though banks suffered from excessive exposure prior to the Asian crisis because of risky 
corporate lending, the exposure seemed to be so profitable that the crisis countries, especially 
Korea, experienced a substantial increase in the number of non-bank financial institutions. In 
addition, non-bank financial institutions faced looser regulations compared to banks, which 
further increased financial sectors’ vulnerability.   
Because of implicit guarantees provided to financial intermediaries, the loan-deposit ratio 
increased in the crisis countries, which resulted in a maturity mismatch between the financial 
system’s assets and liabilities (Moreno, 1998). Under normal conditions, banks could manage 
their portfolios successfully to meet expected withdrawals. However, financial intermediaries in 
the crisis countries faced problems, because East Asian financial institutions accumulated 
significant external liabilities that were not entirely backed by liquid assets. Hence, they became 
vulnerable to panics (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).  
Many financial institutions became insolvent because they were unable to deal with the 
sudden interruption in the international flow of funds (Moreno, 1998). In addition, overextension 
of credit by financial intermediaries to corporations created the problem of nonperforming loans. 
Even though such loans made up 6 percent of total loans in Korea, it has been suggested that 
accounting conventions used by financial intermediaries underestimated the size of 
nonperforming loans; the true size of nonperforming loans was not known at the time of the 
crisis (Lee, 1998).
3 
Financial sector characteristics were closely related to the characteristics of businesses 
that receive funds from financial intermediaries. In fact, the ownership of financial 
intermediaries and corporations in the crisis countries was highly concentrated. In Korea, for 
example, 15 largest families owned 38 percent of banks, 45 percent of non-bank financial 
institutions, and 69 percent of corporations prior to the crisis (Claessens, Djankov, and 
Klingebiel, 1999). Similar ownership concentrations, which existed in other crisis countries, led 
to inefficient allocation of capital. For example, empirical research regarding Thailand indicates 
                                                 
3 Lee (2001) examines Korea’s life insurance sector that suffered a number of structural deficiencies. Volume driven 
mentality made nearly all life insurance companies that were mostly set up in the late 1980s technically insolvent. 
These companies may have operated using policy holders’ money, and poor investment performance was a result of 
their lack of money. For some companies, the invested assets- policy reserve ratio was less than 50 percent. Because 
of the accounting practices, life insurance companies’ assets were overvalued and liabilities undervalued. 
Additionally, even though the sector was heavily regulated, the actual supervision did not take place, which left the 
life insurance industry without any early warning system (Lee, 2001).   
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that high concentration of corporate ownership decreased corporate profits overtime. In addition, 
corporations with controlling interests in banks indicated higher leverage, suggesting easy 
borrowing (Alba, Claessens, and Djankov, 1998).  
Korea’s chaebol system (large business groups) has been considered as an example of 
inefficiency associated with the government-financial sector-corporations triangle (Ahn, 2001). 
Because of explicit and implicit guarantees provided by the government, Korean bankers may 
not have paid due attention to chaebols’ financial soundness. In 1996, even though the average 
debt/equity ratio of top 30 chaebols was about 400%, these companies did not face any problems 
to obtain further resources (Lee, 1998). This is an example where domestic moral hazard reduces 
financial markets’ ability to channel funds to those who have the most productive investment 
opportunities, because chaebols were viewed as too big to fail (Hahm and Mishkin, 2000). The 
extent of implicit government guarantees was confirmed in 1997, prior to the Korean crisis, 
when the Korean government not only supplied special loans to weaker banks, but also 
encouraged banks to extend emergency loans to certain troubled conglomerates, which were 
having difficulties servicing their debt. It has been suggested that such government actions 
further weakened the financial position of lenders and hence contributed to the uncertainty that 
triggered the Korean crisis later on in 1997 (Krugman, 1999).    
 
A Framework of IMF-Induced Creditor Moral Hazard in the Financial Sector       
In this section, we study investors’ response to IMF-related announcements, assuming 
domestic moral hazard in the financial sector of the prospective program country. As seen below, 
this discussion relates to investor perception regarding the credibility of the IMF in motivating 
the program country to implement necessary reforms. Even though such reforms may eventually 
lead to increasingly efficient allocation of capital in the financial sector, their implementation is 
likely to include measures such as closing of some financial intermediaries and tougher 
regulations. Therefore, investors may expect that any credible attempt to restructure the financial 
sector may result in a distressed financial sector (hence lower returns) during the implementation 
period, which constitutes the basis for the following discussion of investor behavior.  
The first step toward this goal is to describe investors’ expectations regarding the 
program’s credibility in implementing proposed financial sector reforms. Because of the 
existence of domestic moral hazard in the country’s financial sector, we assume that credible 8 
program implementation depends upon the IMF’s ability to motivate the program country’s 
government to implement necessary reforms in the financial sector.
4 If investors perceive that 
IMF programs are credible in the sense that they will lead to widespread reforms and hence a 
major restructuring of the financial sector, investors will expect that IMF actions will mark the 
end of their excessive returns. In this case, we expect a decline in financial sector returns starting 
with the announcement of the IMF program. If, however, investors expect that the IMF cannot 
induce the government to introduce substantial reforms in the financial sector, they will interpret 
the prospective IMF program as a signal that additional source of liquidity into the financial 
system is coming, further supporting implicit guarantees on their returns. In this case, investors 
would perceive the prospective IMF program to be non-credible and we expect an increase in 
financial sector returns associated with IMF-related announcements.  
Additionally, changes in investors’ perception about the program credibility during 
negotiations are possible. Therefore, as the second step, we identify a period called “window” to 
capture potential changes in investor behavior during the program negotiations. In the following, 
we summarize our expectations regarding investors’ response on the days of the two IMF 
announcements and during the window period.  
 
(i) Announcement of program negotiations: This announcement is relevant for two reasons. First, 
investors may assume that, with the announcement that program negotiations have began, the 
probability of a future IMF program in this country is high, because it is rare that the IMF does 
not offer a program and hence funds to the country after the negotiations is concluded. However, 
it is important to note that, even though investors may think of future IMF program as a high 
probability event, they still do not have sufficient information regarding the size and the 
conditions of the financial support on the day of the negotiation announcement. Then investors 
would form their expectations whether the prospective IMF program will introduce credible 
reforms. In the presence of domestic moral hazard, if investors expect credible reforms that are 
likely to decrease their returns in the future for a while, they would sell their financial sector 
shares today, which would produce a decline in financial sector returns. If, however, investors 
expect that the program is less likely to eliminate implicit guarantees and that it may even 
                                                 
4 If there were no domestic moral hazard in the financial sector, investors would view the effects of a prospective 
IMF based on whether it would be stabilizing or destabilizing. If investors view IMF programs stabilizing, returns 
should increase, whereas if they view IMF programs destabilizing, returns should decline.  9 
provide more funds for the financial sector, they would buy financial sector shares, which would 
produce higher returns today.  
 
(ii) Window period: This time period starts from the initial announcement of negotiations 
and continues until the day before the program approval. A future IMF program that was 
perceived credible on the day of the negotiation announcement (lower returns) may be viewed as 
non-credible during the negotiation period, which would lead to higher financial sector returns, 
or vice versa. During this time period, the government’s attitude towards the IMF may influence 
investors’ expectations regarding the credibility of the future IMF program. If investors feel, 
based on their observations, that the government is committed to financial sector reforms, which 
would signal a decline in future implicit guarantees, there will be a decline in financial sector 
returns. If, however, investors believe that the government would be able to receive some 
liquidity without delivering reforms, financial sector returns are expected to increase. 
(iii) Announcement of program approval: The relevance of this announcement lies in the fact that 
the size and the conditions of the financial support are made public on this date. The change in 
financial sector returns on the day of the program approval may indicate whether program 
approval contains significant surprises for investors. If program approval does not contain any 
additional information beyond what investors expected during the window period, investors’ 
sentiments during the window will continue on the day of the program approval. As a result, no 
change in financial sector returns on the day of the program approval could be interpreted as 
such that investors have already discounted the size and the content of the IMF program. 
However, a result of increasing (decreasing) financial sector returns during the window and on 
the approval day would indicate that the information regarding the size and the content of the 
IMF program came as a surprise and that investors expect the continuation (elimination) of 
implicit guarantees in the financial sector.  
In addition to potential changes in investor behavior due to IMF-related news during the 
window period, it is also important to capture average changes in financial sector returns during 
the implementation of an IMF program (program duration). Because investors form their 
expectations on the announcement days regarding the credibility of a future IMF program, 
changes in financial sector returns during the program would indicate whether investors have 
properly discounted future events. Because empirical evidence suggests that GDP growth rates 10 
generally decline during IMF program years (Evrensel, 2002; Prezeworski and Vreeland, 2000), 
it would be appropriate to expect a slower economy and hence lower returns during this time 
period. However, considering the fact that programs last more than a year and asset markets react 
to news and other changes in the overall economy immediately, the overall change in financial 
sector returns during an IMF programs may not be statistically and economically significant.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
We employ daily financial sector returns of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, which are 
obtained from Thomson Financial. The financial sector includes banks, insurance, investment, 
real estate, and specialty financial companies (asset management, investment bankers, consumer 
and mortgage finance, etc.). The sample period runs from January 6, 1992 through December 27, 
2002. We do not limit our sample period to the crisis period only in order to better capture the 
data generating process for stock returns and to account for the impact of program duration on 
financial sector returns.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of financial sector returns. Returns are computed 
using log-differenced stock price index data, multiplied by 100. Positive mean returns are 
observed only in Korea. Standard deviation of financial sector returns is lower in Korea, which 
indicates that financial stocks in this country are associated with lower risk compared to Thailand 
and Indonesia. The figures for the kurtosis indicate the nonnormality of the returns, which is 
confirmed by the statistically significant values of the Jarque-Bera test statistics. The results 
regarding the distribution of financial sector returns are consistent with previous studies. It is 
known that emerging market returns are not normally distributed, which is indicated by skewness 
and excess kurtosis in returns (Bekeart and Harvey, 2002).
5 We use the Bollerslev-Wooldridge 
robust standard errors in estimations to account for the nonnormality of returns in estimations for 
better inferences. 
Regarding our method of estimation, significant ARCH effects observed in initial OLS 
estimates motivated us to employ the maximum likelihood GARCH models. We experimented 
with standard GARCH, as well as asymmetric threshold and exponential GARCH models. We 
                                                 
5 See Bekeart and Harvey (2002) for the implications of distributional properties of emerging market returns for 
portfolio decisions.  
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found that the standard GARCH(1,1) fits the data much better than the asymmetric models and  
it was therefore employed in the rest of estimations. This model can be written as: 
 
 
(1)   Rt = β0 + εt          
(2)  σ
2




t-1          
 
where Rt indicates financial sector returns in period t. Equation (1) is the mean equation, while 
the conditional variance of asset returns, which is assumed time varying, is given by equation 
(2). The mean equation is written as a function of some constant with an error term. Conditional 
variance at time t is predicted based on the persistence in the last period’s shocks (ε
2
t-1) and last 
period’s conditional variance (σ
2
t-1). To capture the impact of our IMF-related news on returns, 
we include two announcement dummies (announcement of negotiations and program approval) 
and two more for capturing the window period and program duration. Table 2 reports the dates 
associated with the IMF announcements and the duration of programs.  
In addition, we want to test for the sequential moral hazard hypothesis that was first 
suggested during the East Asian crisis (among others, Eichengreen, 2000; Friedman, 1998). 
According to this hypothesis, IMF programs provided to other emerging countries may represent 
an additional piece of information for investors to recalculate the probability of an IMF program 
in another emerging country. It has been argued that, because of implicit guarantees associated 
with IMF programs, investors would start buying the country’s financial instruments that is 
suspected to be the next country on the line for the IMF support. To test for this kind of moral 
hazard, we sequentially add other countries’ IMF-related announcement dummies in the mean 
equation of the domestic country as a control variable. By doing so, we want to capture the 
potential effects of prior financial crises in other countries on the domestic country’s financial 
sector returns. While the Indonesian mean equation contains IMF-related announcements about 
Thailand, the Korean mean equation contains IMF-related announcements about Thailand and 
Indonesia.  
With respect to the conditional variance equation, we include a dummy variable for 
program duration in each country’s conditional variance equation to test for the possibility that 12 
the duration of an IMF program affects the conditional variance of financial sector returns as 
well.  
The results of the empirical analysis are shown in Table 3.
6 Dummy variables take a 
value of 1 on the day that negotiations begin (“negotiations” in Table 3) and the day in which 
program approval is announced for each country (“approval” in Table 3), respectively. We use 
the variable “window” to capture the uncertainty about the outcome of negotiations until the 
program announcement. This dummy variable takes a value of 1 from the day after the 
negotiations announcement until the day before the program announcement. Finally, the duration 
dummy takes the value of 1 during the IMF program and zero otherwise. 
When we look at the results for the mean equation, we observe that financial sector 
returns in Thailand decline almost by 2 percent on the day of the negotiation announcement. 
During the window, returns decline by 1.4 percent as well. However, program approval increases 
financial sector returns by 1.2 percent. When these results are compared with our expectations 
established in the previous section, it seems that the changes in financial sector returns on the 
day of the negotiation announcement and during the window are consistent with the credible 
implementation view of the program. Higher returns on the day of the program approval indicate 
that implicit guarantees that have been present in the financial sector are expected to continue 
during the IMF program.  
In Indonesia, the second country in the crisis sequence, financial sector returns increase 
over 8 percent on the day of the negotiation announcement. While there is no in financial sector 
returns during the window, there is an increase in returns on the day of the program approval, 
which is less than half a percentage point. The increase in financial sector returns is consistent 
with the view of a non-credible IMF program in the future. Investors may have viewed the 
negotiation announcement as a signal for more funds to be diverted to their sector, which would 
make the already existing adverse selection in the financial sector more pronounced. The finding 
of no statistically significant changes in financial sector returns during the window period may 
indicate the continuation of investor sentiment associated with the initial negotiation 
                                                 
6 Our estimations include a number of lagged dependent variables as necessary to remove serial correlation in 
financial sector returns. Even though the autoregressive terms are significant in all three countries, they are most 
persistent in Thailand, lasting for 8 days. In Indonesia and Korea, the autoregressive terms are persistent for only 
one day. In Korea, the statistical significance of persistency in returns is marginal. These results are not reported, but 
available upon request from the authors. 
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announcement. Finally, the increase in returns on the day of the program approval may be 
associated with expected continuation of implicit guarantees in the financial sector. The observed 
small change in returns indicates that information contained in the announcement was not much 
of a surprise. 
When we look at the findings for Korea, financial sector returns increase over 7.7 percent 
on the day of the negotiation announcement. Even though the Korean window period indicates 
an average decline of almost 4.4 percent in returns, financial sector returns increase by 7.4 
percent on the day of the program approval. The substantial increase in financial sector returns 
on the day of the negotiation announcement is consistent with the non-credible interpretation of 
the future IMF program. Investors might have viewed the negotiation announcement as a signal 
for more funds to be diverted to their sector. Hence, they expected that the adverse selection 
present in the sector will continue during the IMF program. However, the decline in returns 
during the window period may indicate a switch in investor perception towards credible reforms 
in the financial sector.
7 Finally, the substantial increase in returns on the day of the program 
approval may indicate surprise news, such as higher than expected funds that would support the 
continuation of implicit guarantees in the financial sector during the IMF program. This finding 
is consistent with the evidence; Korea received the largest support among the three crisis 
countries.    
With respect to the program duration variable in the mean equation, changes in returns 
are not statistically significant in Thailand and Korea during their respective programs. However, 
in Indonesia, financial sector returns declined by a quarter of a percentage point during the IMF 
program. This change is very small, however, given the long time frame considered. Overall, the 
results suggest that financial sector returns during the IMF program were not much different than 
those during non-program years in all countries. 
                                                 
7 The fact that there are differences among countries in terms of the changes in financial sector returns during the 
window may be based on differences in countries’ commitment to IMF programs and structural reforms. To get 
more insight on this issue, we collected country-related news during the window period. This information suggested 
that Korea seemed to be more committed to its IMF program than Thailand and Indonesia. For example, on 
November 22, 1997, the next day after the announcement of negotiations, Korea's president apologized for the 
economic crisis that drove his government to seek financial help from the IMF. In Thailand, however, the 
problematic IMF-government relations during the negotiations eventually led to the resignation of the finance 
minister and later the prime minister. In Indonesia, the negotiation period was especially problematic because of the 
president’s and his family’s involvement in the economic affairs of the country, especially in the direct ownership of 
many private businesses.    
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The results associated with the conditional variance equation indicate that time-varying 
volatility is present in all returns. Additionally, there is an increase in the volatility of financial 
sector returns during IMF programs in all countries. We note that the duration dummy is 
included both in the mean and conditional variance equations, while other IMF-related news are 
included only in the mean equation. This is because their inclusion in the variance equation led 
to significant convergence problem. This issue aside, the exclusion of IMF-related news in the 
variance equation may be reasonable because our objective is not to study how particular IMF-
related news affects conditional variance of financial sector returns. Rather, we are simply 
interested in capturing the observed time varying volatility of returns to make better inferences. 
Our reported diagnostic tests imply robust estimations. The Q tests show no sign of serial 
correlation, while the Q
2 test statistics indicate that the estimated model successfully accounts for 
all time varying volatility in returns up to 10 lags. 
 
Discussion of results  
Most empirical studies that examine the relationship between financial sector returns and 
IMF programs rely on bank stock returns. There is no clear cut evidence, however, that IMF 
support has a positive impact on returns. For example, empirical evidence from Korea indicates 
that news of IMF financial support increases stock returns of both domestic and foreign banks 
with exposure to Korea (Zhang, 2001). Similarly, IMF-related news in crisis countries increases 
bank stocks returns in 16 Asian crisis countries, other Asian countries, and western countries 
with banks having East Asian exposure (Lau and McInish, 2003). On the other hand, some 
studies (e.g., Brealey and Kaplanis, 2004 and  Choe et al., 1999) indicate that IMF-related 
announcements are not associated with clear patterns in bank stocks. Finally, other studies, with 
a more general focus, examine how news that signals public support to financial sectors affects 
returns in this sector. They find that news of government insurance for liabilities has a positive 
impact on financial sector returns; however, returns in non-financial sector decline, if public 
funds are used for bank bail-outs (Klingebiel, Kroszner, Leaven, Oijen, 2000).  
These studies do not provide a moral hazard interpretation of their findings. Exception is 
the study by Klingebiel, Kroszner, Leaven, Oijen (2000). Their empirical result supports the 
hypothesis that the introduction of implicit or explicit guarantees is associated with higher 
financial sector returns. Our results are consistent with the IMF-driven creditor moral hazard 15 
hypothesis in that financial sector returns in especially Indonesia and Korea increase due on the 
days of announcements of negotiations and program approval. However, the challenge is how to 
interpret the dynamic nature of investors’ reactions to IMF-related news from the time of 
negotiations through the day of approval. 
For example, in Thailand, even though financial sector returns decline on the day of the 
negotiation announcement and during the window, they increase on the day of program approval. 
One interpretation is a moral hazard interpretation in that higher financial sector returns on the 
day of the program announcement reflect that the size and the content of the announced program 
on that day failed to signal future fundamental reforms. Therefore, investors expected that 
implicit guarantees will continue in an environment of increased liquidity due to the approved 
IMF program. However, considering the dynamic nature of investor behavior, an alternative 
interpretation may suggest that, following declining financial sector returns prior to the approval, 
higher returns on the approval day may signal a switch in investor perception towards a more 
credible IMF program in introducing fundamental reforms in the financial sector.  
In Indonesia, we observe large increases in financial sector returns on the day of the 
negotiation and approval announcement (8 percent and 5 percent, respectively), even though 
returns remain unchanged during the window. One can argue that the well-publicized problems 
between the IMF and the Indonesian government during the program negotiations may have 
produced the result during the window. However, once the size and the content of the program 
were announced, investors may have expected the continuation of implicit guarantees. Therefore, 
the Indonesian results may have a moral hazard interpretation.  
In Korea, as in Indonesia, we observe large increases in financial sector returns on the 
day of the negotiation and approval announcement (7.7 percent and 7.4 percent respectively). 
However, in this country, financial sector returns experience a decline of 4.4 percent during the 
window. It seems that, even if investors did not expect any credible future reforms in the 
financial sector on the day of the negotiation announcement, their expectations may have 
changed during the negotiations (window period). They may have observed more commitment 
for the financial sector reform demonstrated by the IMF and the Korean government. However, a 
substantial increase in returns on the day of program approval points out to two possibilities. 
Investors expect that implicit guarantees will continue in an environment of increased liquidity 
that will be provided by the IMF. Or, considering the dynamic nature of investor behavior, 16 
following declining financial sector returns during the window, the increase in returns on the 
approval day may suggest that investors now believe that future IMF program is more credible 
than they thought in introducing fundamental reforms in the financial sector.  
  The above discussion makes it clear that the moral hazard interpretation of changes in 
financial sector returns due to IMF-related news may not be straightforward. An important 
challenge for future research is to provide more direct testing techniques and hence more 
straightforward interpretation of changes in financial returns due to IMF-related news.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks   
We investigate the changes in financial sector returns due to IMF-related news in 
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand during the East Asian crisis and provide alternative 
interpretations of these changes, including moral hazard. Our hypothesis is that implicit 
guarantees present in financial sectors in financially- troubled countries may become more 
pronounced due to IMF programs. Two casual observations support this hypothesis. First, the 
vulnerabilities of the financial sector have been mentioned as the primary source of the crisis. It 
is known that the financial sectors of the crisis countries seriously suffered from adverse 
selection before the East Asian crisis and the extension of the IMF support. Second, IMF funds 
mainly increase the liquidity of the program country, particularly the liquidity of the financial 
sector. Therefore, if IMF programs are not expected to implement credible financial sector 
reforms, investors may expect the continuation of implicit guarantees present in this sector, 
which would motivate them to take excessive risks.   
  Our empirical results indicate that, especially in Indonesia and Korea, financial sector 
returns increased substantially on the days of negotiation and approval announcements. We 
interpret the findings as evidence of creditor moral hazard, because, according to our framework, 
in the presence of domestic implicit guarantees, expectations of non-credible IMF programs 
would increase financial sector returns, causing IMF-driven moral hazard effects. However, our 
evidence that financial sector returns did not change in Indonesia and declined in Korea during 
the window period presents a challenge to the moral hazard interpretation of IMF-related news. 
Future research should incorporate additional perspectives such as other financial markets and 
further country- and sector-specific information to provide more accurate interpretations of 
changes in financial sector returns due to IMF-related news.  17 
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Table 2: Dates associated with IMF-related news and program duration 
1 
 
 Thailand   
 
Indonesia Korea 
Announcements associated with IMF programs 
2  
 
Start of negotiations 
 
08/05/97 10/08/97 11/21/97 
Program approval 
 






08/20/97 11/05/97 12/04/97 
Expiration date 
 
06/19/00 11/04/00 12/03/00 
 
1 The term “program” implies standby arrangements.  
2 Dates associated with IMF-related announcements are based on Lane and Phillips (2000).  
3 Annual Report of the IMF in 1998 and 1999 provides the duration information. Effective and 
expiration dates imply the start and the end of a program respectively.   
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 Table 3: GARCH estimations of daily financial sector returns in Thailand, 
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1 Numbers in parenthesis are p values.  
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